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INTRODUCTION
Martin E. Connor*
Contributions of huge amounts of money by wealthy individuals
and corporations to American political campaigns have a long and
sordid history. For example, in 1860, New York Democrats put
together a Fusion slate so voters could vote against Lincoln without
dividing their votes among the three Democratic opponents.1 New
York merchants contributed substantial funds.2 Reports stated that
William Astor had given $1 million to the campaign.3 This was
$27,780,000 in 2013 dollars, at a time when there was no radio or
television on which to spend it.4 The campaign was for New York
State presidential electors only.5
In 1896, Mark Hanna was widely reported to have raised and
contributed $3.5 million to elect William McKinley to the Presidency.6
This was equivalent to $94,605,000 in current day dollars.7 That
amount was solely for the national effort.8 State party committees at
the time bore the major burden of raising and spending for the
Presidential campaign.9 Where did the money come from? All banks
and large corporations were assessed a percentage of their profits.10

* B.A. (Politics) 1968, J.D. 1970, The Catholic University of America. Election
attorney since 1972. NYS Senator, 1978–2008 (Minority Leader, 1995–2002).
1. See WALTER STAHR, SEWARD, LINCOLN’S INDISPENSABLE MAN 207 (Simon &
Schuster, 2012).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Inflation Calculator, DAVEMANUAL.COM, http://www.davemanuel.com/
inflation-calculator.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
5. See STAHR, supra note 1, at 207.
6. See WILLIAM T. HORNER, OHIO’S KINGMAKER: MARK HANNA, MAN AND
MYTH 193 (Ohio Univ. Press 2010).
7. See Inflation Calculator, supra note 4.
8. See HORNER, supra note 6, at 193.
9. See id. at 201–12.
10. See id. at 195.
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How and where was it spent? With no TV or radio, one can only
imagine the payoffs that were made.
In the 1960 presidential election, it was an open secret that Joseph
P. Kennedy spent millions of dollars to make his son the President.11
The exact amount is uncertain since no disclosure was required.
There are many stories of the bundles of hundred dollar bills used in
the 1960 campaigns.12 Both contributions and expenditures were
commonly made in cash.13
The lack of disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures
in the first 160 years or so of our Republic does not mean there was
no recognition of the potential for corruption. Indeed, succeeding to
the Presidency upon the death of McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt led
the successful charge to pass a ban on corporations contributing to
federal campaigns.14
However, the realization that money was corrupting elections went
back further than the early twentieth century. The earliest casebook
on American election law of which I am aware is A Collection of
Leading Cases on the Law of Elections in the United States.15 In its
766 pages, there is but one mention of campaign contributions.16 It
arose in the context of a suit for a debt for rent.17 In 1840, the plaintiff
had erected a log cabin on Broadway in New York City at the request
of the defendant.18 The log cabin was intended for public and other
meetings of the Whig Party and for the sale of refreshments.19

11. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE PASSAGE OF POWER: THE YEARS OF LYNDON
JOHNSON 84–85 (2012).
12. See id. at 72.
13. See id. at 293.
14. See American President: Biography of Theodore Roosevelt, MILLER CTR.,
http://www.millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/essays/biography/print (last visited
Apr. 1, 2013).
15. FREDERICK CHARLES BRIGHTLY, A COLLECTION OF LEADING CASES ON THE
LAW OF ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1871).
16. Id. at 612–15.
17. Id.
18. See Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill 27, 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843), aff’d, 7 Hill 387
(N.Y. 1844). The 1844 affirmance was by an 11-11 split in the Court for the
Correction of Errors, New York’s highest court made up of the Chancellor and all
the State Senators. See About the Court, APP. DIVISION SECOND JUDICIAL DEP’T,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2/aboutthecourt.shtml (last visited Apr. 19,
2013).
19. See Jackson, 5 Hill 27.
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In August of 1840, the plaintiff announced that he would be taking
down the log cabin because he was losing money.20 It cost the
plaintiff $1,600 or $1,800 to build the cabin.21 A subscription was
opened and $200 was raised.22 The defendant told the plaintiff that he
wanted the cabin to be kept open until after the election and that he
“would not permit the whig flag across Broadway to be struck.”23 He
promised to raise the balance of $1,000 or pay it out of his own
pocket.24 The plaintiff kept the log cabin open until after the
election.25 The plaintiff sued the defendant in New York City
Superior Court for the promised amount.26 The defendant alleged
that the contribution of $1,000 for a campaign headquarters was
illegal and thus his promise of payment for such was unenforceable.27
After the trial judge denied the defendant’s motion to find the
contract illegal, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff.28 On appeal to
the Supreme Court of New York, the judgment was reversed on the
grounds that a contribution for a campaign headquarters was illegal
under an 1829 statute.29
In an effort to ensure the “purity of elections,” the New York
Legislature had enacted a statute making it unlawful (a
misdemeanor) for any candidate or any other person to pay for, or
contribute any money for any “purpose intended to promote an
election of any particular person or ticket, except for defraying the
expenses of printing, and the circulation of votes, handbills and other
papers, previous to any election.”30 Interestingly enough, this statute
more or less banned campaign expenditures toward any sort of “get
out the vote” operations. Since the purpose of keeping the log cabin
open was clearly to promote the election of “Gen. Harrison” for

20. See id. at 28.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 28, 31–32.
28. See id. at 28.
29. See id. at 31–32.
30. Act of May 5, 1829, ch. 373, § 1(5), 1829 N.Y. Laws 565–66. Political parties,
or factions, printed the actual ballot marked for their candidates and the voters took
them into polling places and deposited them into the ballot boxes.
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President and the Whig ticket in general, the expenditure was illegal
and the promised payment was unenforceable.31
The court rejected the contention that the statute was intended
only to forbid the contribution of money for corrupt purposes.32 The
court stated that “[t]he legislature evidently thought that the most
effectual way ‘to preserve the purity of election,’ was to keep them
free from the contaminating influence of money.”33 It should be
noted that the court also commented that “[t]here can be little doubt
that large sums of money are expended upon elections for other
purposes; but the statute says, ‘it shall not be lawful’ to do so, and the
enactment should either be enforced or repealed.”34
While the statute in question seems shocking to us in its lack of
concern for free speech, it must be remembered that the Fourteenth
Amendment had not yet been passed35 and that the First Amendment
then applied only to the federal government.36 Obviously, New York
State’s constitutional guarantee of free speech37 was not seen to cover
campaign contributions and expenditures.
Modern day reformers are prone to advance proposals to define
exactly what constitutes the legitimate use of campaign funds, and
many states have already done so. Aside from concerns about
candidates’ use of contribution funds for expenditures that are clearly
personal, some laws on expenditures obviously impede legitimate
political strategies employed by candidates. Local conditions can
make gestures like sending flowers, perhaps to important constituents
who are hospitalized or to the funerals of those that have passed
away, a wise and necessary political expenditure—and one a
candidate should be no more expected to pay from her personal funds
than a businessman who makes such gestures to purely business
acquaintances.
Does anyone who has ever examined the 1960 presidential
campaign doubt that John F. Kennedy chose wisely when he engaged
his brother Robert as his campaign manager? Of course, no one
knows how the manager’s expenses were paid since that was in the

31. See generally Jackson, 5 Hill at 31.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Even after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment was
not applied to New York until 1925. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
36. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
37. N.Y. CONST. OF 1821, art.VII, § 8.
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“cash and carry” era. In my opinion, campaign finance restrictions
against employing relatives are overreaching. A relative just might be
the best person for the job. However, that does not mean funneling
campaign funds to a relative for “no-show” employment should be
tolerated.
In my first foray into politics, following my graduation from law
school and move to New York, I joined a local “Reform” Democratic
club in 1971. The club had no relationship to the official Democratic
Party organization; indeed, it usually opposed the regular party’s
candidates. The major issue for the club’s members was opposition to
the Vietnam War. Dues were $5.00 per year ($7.00 a couple). The
annual fundraiser that year was $10.00 per person. At club meetings,
we passed around a hat to raise money for planned activities.
In 1972, the club’s major mission was to support George McGovern
for President and to oppose our incumbent Representative who
supported the war effort. The geographic area where the club
worked consisted of eighteen election districts—about thirty-two city
blocks. Club members knocked on doors and handed out literature
the club printed urging support for the candidates. I spent about $140
on canvas cards—index cards containing the names and addresses of
each voter. The late David Levine, a local caricaturist of note,
donated a limited edition of a caricature print he did of McGovern for
us. We sold about fifty of them for a twenty-five dollar contribution
to our local McGovern “committee.”
The only “official” contact we had with the McGovern campaign
occurred weekly when one member would go to the NYC McGovern
headquarters and get as many “Vote for McGovern” lapel buttons as
he could talk out of them. On Saturdays at the main street corner in
the neighborhood, we set up a table, handed out the literature we had
printed and sold the buttons for a quarter a piece. A few affluent
types would put a dollar in the can. One Saturday, our “button haul”
was $275. All the money we raised went to printing more literature
and two mailings (one before the primary and one before the General
Election). For the mailings, we sat around tables and hand-addressed
a piece to each voter.
We kept no record of who threw money into the effort. Everyone
was a volunteer; no one stole any of the money. We helped elect our
McGovern delegates to the National Convention and paid for some
of them to go to Miami. While McGovern was badly beaten in most
places in the country in the general election, he won our little
neighborhood by a thirteen to one margin.
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No one in our grassroots effort was seeking any favor from a
President McGovern. No one important in his campaign knew any of
us. We probably raised and spent about $4,500 (about $24,700 in
2013 dollars). We did not have to file any forms then or make any
disclosures. Today, we would be in big trouble unless we had a
lawyer and kept track of those quarters, filed reports, placed a fair
market value on those prints, and kept detailed records. In order to
prevent corruption, a totally voluntary grassroots effort like I have
described is no longer possible.
Two major devices embraced by the post-Watergate reforms in
federal and state laws are disclosure and limits on contributions.38 In
more recent years, disclosure requirements have been expanded to
include identification of a contributor’s employer.39 The rationale for
this requirement is that the public has a right to know the economic
interests who are supporting the candidate.40
While one can reasonably conclude that contributors who are
CEOs or top management of a business are supporting a candidate
because they believe she has been, or will be, sympathetic to their
business’s economic interest, the same cannot necessarily be said
about the motivations of every employee who makes a contribution.
It may be that lower level employees have contributed to the
candidate’s campaign because they agree with the candidate on other
issues more important to them than whether the company they work
for gets a particular tax break. Perhaps they are avid sportsmen,
committed feminists, a second cousin or former classmate of the
candidate, committed political party members, neighbors of the
candidate concerned foremost about a community issue, or someone
who identifies ethnically with the candidate. The list of possible
reasons for someone making a contribution is diverse and could go on
forever.
Disclosing the employers of contributors who happen to work for a
very large company employing thousands invariably causes the press
to write stories such “XYZ Corporation Contributes Big Bucks to
Candidate.” Unfortunately, that is the information that will reach
most voters even though it is merely an inference that may not be
justified by the actual facts.
38. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976); see also Richard Briffault,
Citizens United: Democracy Realized—or Defeated?, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1682
(2012).
39. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(13) (2012).
40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 3.
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I believe that contributing to a political campaign within legally
mandated limits is part of a citizen’s First Amendment rights. The
more people who see making a contribution as part of their
participation in the political process, the better off our democracy will
be. I have always been wary of anything that I viewed as discouraging
persons from participating in the public forum, including by making a
financial commitment to a campaign.
Some years ago on the New York State Senate floor I expressed
my concern with a colleague’s proposed “campaign finance reform”
bill, which I supported, because it would have required disclosure of
employment information (the bill had no chance of passing in that
body then, or possibly now!). My concern was, and is, the possible
retaliation by the employer should a person contribute to a campaign
for a candidate the employer opposes.
Perhaps the most expansive protection of employees in the country
is found in the New York City Human Rights Law. It forbids
discrimination in employment (refusal to hire or discharge) “because
of the actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin,
gender, disability, marital status, partnership status, sexual
orientation or alienage or citizenship status of any person”41 as well as
because of “actual or perceived status of said individual as a victim of
domestic violence, or as a victim of sex offenses or stalking.”42 While
federal and New York State election laws guard against the
nineteenth century practice of employers marching their employees
off to vote in lockstep, nothing I am aware of prevents an employer
from discharging an employee because they do not like the
contributions she has made to candidates.
Perhaps requiring too much regulation and/or disclosure prevents
true grassroots political activity and deters ordinary citizens from
contributing to campaigns. This consideration has not often been
given a fair hearing in the rush for reform.
In The Public’s Right to Know Versus Compelled Speech, Dick
Carpenter and Jeff Milyo have presented much food for thought
concerning the advisability of requiring disclosure of contributors in
non-candidate elections.43 Is the danger of corruption really present

41. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1)(a) (2012).
42. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107.1(2).
43. Dick Carpenter & Jeffrey Milyo, The Public’s Right to Know Versus

Compelled Speech: What Does Social Science Research Tell Us About the Benefits
and Costs of Campaign Finance Disclosure in Non-Candidate Elections?, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603 (2012).
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in such elections? Or, is the concern that the public ought to know
who is trying to influence their opinions? If the latter policy is the
reason, does it ignore the fact that the arguments advanced, no matter
the source, ought to be the persuasive determinant with the voters?
The authors’ survey of social science research certainly calls into
question the rationale for mandating disclosure in non-candidate
elections.
There seems to be a grave concern about anonymous messages in
campaigns. I have always viscerally felt them unfair. But upon
reflection, it occurs to me that the 100,000 colonists who bought and
read Common Sense did not know, nor did they need to know, that
its author was Thomas Paine. Of course, there was a far better reason
then for anonymity because the author’s life and liberty were at risk.
Certainly, the voters persuaded by The Federalist to vote for
ratification of the Constitution were not apprised of the identity of
Publius or who paid to have the articles published. Only a very few
insiders knew the true authors were Hamilton, Madison, and Jay
when the votes were cast. The cogency of the arguments carried the
day.
Thwarting participation in issues elections by grassroots action of
citizens should be avoided at all costs. Expenditure limits that trigger
disclosure and filing requirements, require legal advice, and threaten
severe penalties for violations should be at high enough amounts to
permit a robust participation by ordinary citizens in grassroots
organizations.
The real dilemma is the fear that big money and the limited
attention span of voters—resulting in their responding to slick and
simplistic two-minute advertisements—will carry the day, regardless
of the inherent merits of the pro and con arguments. If that is so,
then our democracy is truly not functioning as intended. Perhaps the
answer lies in education rather than substituting another shorthand,
notwithstanding the merits of the argument, factor: “who’s paying for
it?”
Amy Loprest and Bethany Perskie’s article Empowering Small
Donors sets forth an explanation of how New York City’s highly
successful multiple match public finance program has worked to focus
candidates’ attention on raising funds in relatively small amounts
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from just “plain folks” in New York City’s neighborhoods.44 They
also explain the challenges facing the program arising from recent
Supreme Court decisions.
In my opinion, the program has generally been a resounding
success. The obvious failure of the program with respect to the last
three mayoral campaigns due to the outlandish campaign spending by
one of the wealthiest men in the world has caused many to doubt the
effectiveness of the system. The authors cite how close Michael
Bloomberg’s victories were.
But, political campaigns are not
horseshoes and close doesn’t count. Democrats Mark Green and Bill
Thompson losing by “only” 35,000 and 50,000 votes, respectively, to a
candidate running on the Republican line in a City with 2.5 million
more Democrats than Republicans shows that Green and Thompson
were not really competitive in persuading voters with the resources
the program provided.
As the authors discuss, the Supreme Court outlawed the “bonus”
provision that awarded Green and Thompson additional matching
funds in response to Bloomberg’s astronomical spending. The New
York City Campaign Finance Board’s only remaining response to
someone spending over $100 million in a mayor’s race is to remove
the cap on expenditures for the financial underdog. That response is
of limited comfort, however, since the additional funds must be raised
at a contribution limit of $4,950 per person before they may be spent.
There is no use in pretending there is a solution to the problems
created by an out-sized self-funder. Buckley v. Valeo45 has precluded
a real solution and its progeny have only made things worse.
The big success of the New York City Campaign Finance program
is the number of small donors that have been brought into play and
now realize that their small contributions count. As the authors note,
the program’s intersection with term limits have produced many
competitive campaigns and encouraged many more candidates to
compete. This big win for democracy is counterbalanced, in my
opinion, by the fact that an expenditure limit of $168,000 for a City
Council campaign is insufficient to overcome the inherent advantages
of incumbency in the absence of scandal or gross incompetence by the
incumbent.

44. Amy Loprest & Bethany Perskie, Empowering Small Donors: New York
City’s Multiple Match Public Financing as a Model for a Post-Citizens United World,
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639 (2012).
45. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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One feature that strikes me about the New York City Campaign
Finance program is the fact that the spending limit for Mayor is
$6,426,000 and only $4,018,000 for the other two citywide offices
(Comptroller and Public Advocate). Is this difference really justified
by a neutral rationale when candidates for all three offices must
appeal to the same number of voters? Of course, Mayor is a more
powerful and important office. But, I know of no discounts available
for radio and television advertisements, postage or printing for the
two lesser offices. If there were any, the Campaign Finance Board
would undoubtedly find them to be in violation of its requirement
that such costs be at “fair market value.” Why should a candidate for
Mayor get to spend $2.41 million dollars more, $1.324 million of it in
public money?
In the era of required disclosure of campaign contributors by
candidates, the widespread exception that has long existed for
“independent expenditure” campaigns, both in federal and state
regulatory schemes is starting to come to a close. A couple of
decades ago, the rules for whether such an effort was truly
independent of the candidate’s campaign were rather clear-cut and
easy to enforce. For example, the Federal Election Commission rules
governing such efforts provided, in addition to the obvious instance of
direct coordination (i.e. the candidate or her campaign requested
and/or directed the effort), that the use of common consultants,
lawyers, pollsters were clear indications of coordination and,
therefore, lack of independence.46 Furthermore, the copying of the
candidate’s campaign literature by the independent campaign for its
own use was deemed to be coordination.47
In my experience, thirty years ago, one of the big obstacles facing
an independent campaign was designing appealing advertisements
and literature without having access to photographs and/or video of
the candidate. The advent of the internet solved that problem as well
as obviating the need for the independent campaign conducting its
own polling. Any serious political campaign today has a website
featuring numerous attractive high-definition photos of the candidate
and video segments. They are in the public domain and are available
for downloading by the independent campaign’s advertisement
crafters without any knowledge or coordination with the candidate’s
campaign.

46. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2012).
47. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)–(8) (2006).
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Even the expense of poll-testing messages and targeting voters
independently has been lifted from independent expenditure
campaigns. A careful scrutiny of the candidate’s website will reveal
messages and voter targets that her campaign has already tested by
polling.
In response to the explosion in the amount of money that has been
injected into the political landscape at every level in recent years,
efforts have been taken at every level of government to require
disclosure of independent expenditures, the identity of contributors,
and the amounts they contributed. Certainly, it is generally accepted
that the public ought to know who are the persons placing such a
heavy weight on the scales in a political contest.
Disclosure of contributors to independent campaigns is generally
justified under the same rationale as candidate disclosure
requirements—as an anti-corruption measure.48 Of course, this is the
only rationale the Supreme Court has accepted as justification for
requiring disclosure. One can make the opposite argument, however,
about requiring the disclosure of contributors to an independent
expenditure effort. Absent disclosure and adhering to the “no
coordination” requirement, a candidate may only know that an
innocuously sounding committee (i.e., “Citizens for Truth” or “Better
Government for New York”) is spending money on her behalf. Press
reports will undoubtedly ferret out the general interests pushing the
effort (e.g., “unions,” “real estate,” “sportsmen,” etc.). But, the
candidate won’t know who is really providing the big bucks for the
effort. With disclosure, she will learn to whom she ought to be
especially responsive in view of the $100,000 he put into the
independent effort. How does that fit in with the anti-corruption
rationale?
In A National Model Faces New Challenges, Janos Marton
provides in in-depth overview of legal and practical challenges
looming for the New York City Public Campaign Finance system.49
My current representation of parties in some of the matters he
reviews precludes me from making extensive commentary.Suffice it to
say that for anyone looking to make sense of the legal challenges and
political landscape in New York City elections in 2013, the article is a

48. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010) (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66; McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 196–97
(2003)).
49. Janos Marton, A National Model Faces New Challenges: The New York City
Campaign Finance System and the 2013 Elections, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673 (2012).
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must-read. The author does an admirable job of informing where we
have been and where we might be headed with respect to campaign
finance.
Professor Jocelyn Benson sets forth a number of principles that
should govern efforts to reform the campaign finance systems at the
federal and state levels in the aftermath of the wounds inflicted by
Citizens United in Saving Democracy: A Blueprint for Reform.50
Surprisingly, the first value she urges is the equality interest. She
makes a compelling case, based on the theory of democracy, for a
system that rejects giving the economic power of big money spenders
an inordinate influence in our elections. It is surprising because,
while I agree with her, the Supreme Court doesn’t. The Court has
rejected the “level playing field” rationale for any campaign finance
regulation.51 The conclusion of the article accounts for her choice.
Professor Benson discusses the historical background to provide
the context for continuing efforts to advance reform, notwithstanding
the obstacles that the Supreme Court has presented. I appreciate her
citing Elihu Root as a leading political activist who first proposed
prohibiting corporate contributions. Root is one of my favorites:
Secretary of War, Secretary of State, United States Senator, winner of
the 1912 Nobel Peace Prize—and the leading New York election
lawyer of his day! Root was on the legal team that secured the
presidency for Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876 and in 1898, he saved
Theodore Roosevelt from being disqualified in his race for Governor
due to a very serious residency problem.
After surveying the prospects for various reforms that have been
tried throughout the country and discussing several approaches as
well as the obstacles to some of them presented by Supreme Court
decisions, Professor Benson offers the obvious solution for bringing
about real comprehensive reform: amend the Constitution to overrule
Buckley v. Valeo as the only way to bring about reform embracing
the equality, information, participation, and anti-corruption interests
she has compellingly demonstrated must be served by a reformed
system. I agree with her conclusion that this is the only way to
accomplish the needed reforms, and I have long believed this to be so.
The Bill of Rights, however, has never been touched by an

50. Jocelyn Benson, Saving Democracy: A Blueprint for Reform in the PostCitizens United Era, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723 (2012).
51. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–50.
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Amendment. Most Americans see the First Amendment as sacred
and inviolable.
In 1972, a fellow Wall Street lawyer associate who lived in my
neighborhood took me to a “petition binding.” It all seemed rather
mundane and I wondered why lawyers were taking such care in
assembling the designating petitions. Three days after the petitions
were filed, the same friend came into my office and said, “Come on,
we have to go to the Board of Elections and see if any challenges
were filed against the petitions.” I didn’t understand what he was
saying, but I went!
That year, I ended up “second seating” my friend in court. It was
exciting and swift action. The next year, I took a case for an insurgent
and succeeded in having the county organization’s candidate for a
City Council seat removed from the ballot. I was hooked. Where
else could one commence a proceeding, try the case, write a brief, and
argue in the Appellate Division and then in New York’s highest
court, the Court of Appeals, all in a six or seven week span? About
four years into doing these election law cases I asked an older
election lawyer whether he thought anyone would ever pay a lawyer
to do them. His definitive answer was: “No way.”
The bible for New York election lawyers in those days was the two
volume Gassman’s treatise.52 In its 975 pages and hundreds of cases
cited, there is not a single mention of campaign finance or
contributions. Including its final Cumulative Supplement (1985-1986)
by D. Alan Wrigley, Jr., only two cases mention campaign finance
and they deal only with the use of party funds in a primary.53
In 1989, a new monograph on New York election law was
published.54 In its 344 pages, only two of them deal with campaign
finance law and then only to reprint a few sections of the New York
Statute adopted in 1974.55 Of course, by that time there were a
number of works on federal campaign finance law. Now that election
law has emerged in the last fifteen years as a “subject” in law school,
new casebooks have been published and they have substantial space

52. See generally 1–2 BENJAMIN GASSMAN, ELECTION LAW DECISIONS AND
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1962).
53. See id. at §§ 9, 19.
54. See generally EDWARD I. BYER, ELECTION LAW DECISIONS AND PROCEDURE
(1989).
55. See id. at 324–25.
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dedicated to campaign finance law.56 The latest monograph on New
York election law has a section on campaign finance as well.57
For the thirty-one years I served in the State Senate, my law
practice consisted almost exclusively of election law for the simple
reason that the “season” for ballot access cases, post-election
recounts, and court challenges neatly corresponded to the Senate
being in recess. About half the work I did was pro bono for political
allies or colleagues. In 2001, when the New York City Campaign
Finance Board ruled that people like me could no longer volunteer
our professional services for friends and allies, I was delighted. The
rules now required even my closest friends running for City office to
pay market rate!
Election law is no longer such a seasonal law practice. The major
reason is the extensive body of campaign finance law and rules,
particularly the federal law and the rules of the New York City
Campaign Finance Board. Virtually every serious candidate or
incumbent wants to be sure their campaigns are in compliance to
avoid penalties, fines, and, even more important for them, to escape
damaging publicity and prevent opponents from having negative
ammunition for campaign use. The lawyers they retain naturally
want to give them solid legal advice.
Allen Dickerson and Zac Morgan in Campaign Finance Advisory
Opinions at the State Level present the case for why election officials
in the states ought to have clearly defined authority to issue advisory
opinions on campaign finance questions about which candidates
(and/or their lawyers) may have questions.58 These questions arise
quite frequently in campaigns and the legal and political stakes are
high.
The authors have surveyed the laws in every state and have noted
the practice for each state with respect to whether it has a single
enforcement authority, an agency authorized to issue advisory
opinions, and whether such opinions provide a “safe harbor” for the
recipient. Every campaign finance regulatory system ought to have as

56. See generally DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P.
TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2012); SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2007).
57. See JERRY H. GOLDFEDER, GOLDFEDER’S MODERN ELECTION LAW chs. 8 & 9
(3d ed. 2012).
58. Allen Dickerson & Zac Morgan, Campaign Finance Advisory Opinions at the
State Level, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773 (2012).

CONNOR_CHRISTENSEN2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

INTRODUCTION

6/3/2013 3:28 PM

601

its principle goal widespread compliance. The best way to accomplish
this is with an agency that assists candidates in complying with the
law.
Frankly, it has always amazed me that legislators enact laws
governing campaign finance or other campaign activities and do not
provide for binding advisory opinions with a safe harbor provision.
After all, whether any of their constituents ever become a candidate
is unknown; yet, it is virtually certain that most all legislators will be
candidates again. More than once I have had clients who are elected
officials consult me about a problem where they may be penalized
because of a statute they insist is unclear or unfair. Sometimes I can’t
resist saying, “You voted for this.”

